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CASE COMMENTS

FEDERAL CONTEMPT POWER: REMOVAL FROM OFFICE
OF STATE OFFICIAL FOR VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL COURT INJUNCTION
Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
86 Sup. Ct. 1445 (1966)
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida enjoined any interference with the orderly integration of
restaurants and motels in St. Augustine, Florida, under authority of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appellant, a special deputy
sheriff of St. Johns County, was held in civil contempt of court for
performing certain acts under color of his official duty, which violated
the injunction. He was ordered to obey all terms of the injunction,
pay attorney fees to the complainant, and permanently resign his
position as deputy sheriff. On appeal HELD, that the order directing
appellant to resign his position as a special deputy sheriff, as modified
to allow resumption of law enforcement duties upon compliance
with the injunction, was within the district court's power to sanction
for civil contempt. Judgment affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari,' Justices Black and Harlan dissenting with
2
opinions.
Sanctions may be employed against anyone held in civil contempt
of court to coerce compliance with an injunction of the court.3
Courts have heretofore limited sanctions for civil contempt to imprisonment for a period of time terminating upon the contemner's
willingness to obey the court's order or to a compensatory fine paid
to the complainant.' Although the power of federal courts to sanction for contempt is supported by statutory and common law, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the power is inherent in
the grant of judicial power and is independent of legislative action.5
The first codification of the contempt power was found in the
Judiciary Act of 1789.6 In 1821, the Supreme Court acknowledged
the sanctions of fine and imprisonment provided for in the act as the
known and recognized limits of the federal contempt power. 7 Again
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 1445 (1966).
2. 86 Sup. Ct. 1380, 1383- (1966) (dissenting opinions).
3. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821). See DANGEL, CONTEMPT 19, 40 (1939).
4. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448, 449 (1911); United
States v. International Union, UMW, 190 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States
v. Onam, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 869 (1952).
5. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821).
6. 1 Stat. 83 (1789).
7. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 2g8 (1821),
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in 1873, the Court held that the enactment was a limitation upon
the manner in which the power could be exercised and was a negation of all other modes of punishment.8 The present federal contempt statute also confers upon the federal courts the power to fine
and to incarcerate. 9 The absence of recorded decisions in which
sanctions other than fine or imprisonment have been imposed, whether
based on the inherent contempt power of the courts or upon the
federal contempt statute, indicates that the courts have generally followed the limitations early acknowledged by the Supreme Court.
The contempt power of the courts has been infrequently and only
indirectly injected into the conflict between state and federal powers.10
None of the circumstances in which the federalism issue has arisen
involved use of the federal contempt power to force the resignation
of a state official as in the instant case.
A federal collector of internal revenue refused, on the authority
of federal regulations, to produce certain documents in a state civil
proceeding. He was fined and imprisoned for contempt of the state
court and he subsequently brought habeas corpus proceedings in a
federal district court. The district court, in In re Comingore,"
ordered the release of the official and held that because the state had
no right to inspect the federal documents, the state's use of the contempt power to procure them was improper. In United States v.
Tobin, 2 an official of the New York-New Jersey Port Authority was
ordered to produce port authority documents before a congressional
committee. He was held in contempt, despite arguments that the
federal investigatory powers involved were an unconstitutional interference with the federal system of government established by the
tenth amendment. The contempt conviction in Tobin was reversed
on appeal, but the appellate court left untouched the trial court's
finding that the interest of the national government outweighed the
interest of the state in the exclusive administration of its internal
affairs.13 The lower court's observation that such a balance need not
always tip in favor of the federal government suggests that a case-by8. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873).
9. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964). Until 1952, the general contempt statute was found
under Title 28, "Judicial Code and Judiciary." Its present codification under Title
18, "Crimes and Criminal Punishment," has caused speculation that the provision
and any limitations arising from its judicial interpretation now apply to criminal
contempt alone. See Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U.
Cm. L. REV. 120 n.3, at 120 (1965).
10.

GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 274 (1963).

11. 96 Fed. 552 (D. Ky. 1899), aff'd sub nom., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S.
459 (1900). See also United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
12. 195 F. Supp. 588 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
13, Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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case analysis of the interests involved may control' the outcome of
close situations.
The federal courts have shown a marked hesitation to interfere
in a state judicial or administrative proceeding not involving a federal
official, especially when a state or local office has been at stake.14
State interests in internal administrative autonomy may warrant a
similar restraint in the use of federal contempt sanctions, which
would effectively dilute the powers normally exercised by state and
local officials.
The Supreme Court, in In re Sawyer,15 held that an injunction
and subsequent contempt convictions of city authorities who were attempting to remove a police judge from office were invalid. The Court
found the principle well-settled that a court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment and removal of public officers, whether
the power of appointment and removal is vested in executive or administrative boards or officers or is entrusted to a judicial tribunal.
The reasons precluding this interference were said to apply with increased force when the court is one of the federal government and
the officers are those of a state.' 6 The concurring justice emphasized
that complete independence from federal interference should be enjoyed by state and municipal bodies in the appointment and removal
of their officers.' 7 The same sentiment was expressed in Walton v.
House of Representatives,'8 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of a request to enjoin an impeachment proceeding against a
state officer by state officials. In Wilson v. North Carolina,19 the Court
was asked to examine the suspension of a state railroad commissioner
by the Governor. Holding that the removal procedure did not violate
due process, the Court recognized that in its internal administration a
state has entire freedom of choice in the creation of an office and in
the terms upon which it is held. The Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr,20 interpreted Sawyer and Walton as imposing only a "traditional limit" upon the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
Court's decision in Baker effectively abolished the offices of numerous
members of the Tennessee Legislature and of other legislatures
similarly situated. The potency of the traditional restraint exercised
by federal courts in matters affecting the internal affairs of a state is
14. Walton v. House of Representatives, 265 U.S. 487 (1924); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); In re
Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Fineran v. Bailey, 2 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1924).

15. 124 U.S. 200 (1888).
16. Id. at 220.

17. In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 212 (1888) (concurring opinion).

18. 265 U.S. 487 (1924).
19. 169 U.S. 586 (1898).
20.

269 U.S. 186, 231 (1962).
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left in doubt by the slight recognition given in Baker v. Carr to the
Sawyer and Walton cases and by the sweeping effect of the Court's
decision.
In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,21 the Court denied federal equitable intervention into an erroneous state court action that threatened
the petitioner. According to the Court, the necessity for preserving
the independence of the state judiciary forbids such intervention
except in cases where irreparable injury is threatened. This hesitation to intervene in purely state proceedings has not, however, prevented use of the injunction and contempt powers of fine and imprisonment against state officials who threaten to violate or actually
violate a federal statute or court order.22
Although sanctions of fine and imprisonment have often been
imposed for violation of court injunctions, neither of the two authorities cited by the appellee in the present case concerns the exercise or expansion of the contempt power. 23 In Bush v. Orleans Parish
School Board,24 a Louisiana statute provided for appointment of the
Governor to act in place of any school board that was under order to
integrate and for operation of the schools on a segregated basis. A
federal district court found the statute unconstitutional on its face
and issued a temporary injunction restraining the Governor from
acting under the act, thereby returning control of the schools to the
school board. The removal of the Governor from his capacity as
acting head of the Orleans Parish schools was predicated on unconstitutionality of the statute authorizing the appointment and not on
any disobedience of a court injunction.
In Meredith v. Fair,25 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered
the Mississippi Board of Trustees for State Institutions of Higher
Learning to revoke and rescind an action appointing Governor Ross
Barnett as agent of the board with power to act upon all matters pertaining to the registration and admission of James Meredith to the
University of Mississippi. The removal from the state office, if such
a temporary authority can be classified as a bona fide office, was ac21. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
22. E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. 1962). See generally Developments in the Law -Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 994, 1045 (1965).
23. Brief for Appellee, p. 22, Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1445 (1966). No authorities were cited by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in support of its approval of the
contempt power to compel the resignation of a state official in Lance v. Plummer,
supra.
24. 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
25. Order of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Sept. 24, 1962,
reported in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 755 (1962).
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complished by an order from the court pursuant to a previously
issued injunction and did not involve use of the contempt power.2"
The order was issued to the body that had granted the authority and
not to the Governor. Only later was Governor Barnett found in contempt of court, and there the coercive sanctions employed were a
fine of 10,000 dollars per day and commission. to the custody of the
27
United States Attorney General.
In further justification of the court's order in the instant case, the
appellee contended that if imprisonment were a proper sanction, then
imposition of a "lesser sanction" would be appropriate. 2 An officer
who is forced to resign or the official whose powers of removal and
appointment are thwarted may not agree that such a sanction is less
severe. But the severity of the measure appears incidental to the
more fundamental question whether any deviation whatsoever is, or
should be, allowed from the statutory and common law,29 especially
when that measure may encroach on the powers of another sovereign.
A sanction that orders a state official of any type to resign his position represents a new and unprecedented employment of the contempt power available to the federal courts. In the present case the
sanction affected an unpaid, voluntary, but officially appointed deputy
sheriff, responsible to the sheriff and subject to removal by him alone.3o
The trial court's order calling for appellant's resignation was undoubtedly intended to prevent further violation of the injunction
through the use of appellant's official position. The trial court declared that it had no intention of restricting or interfering with the
powers and authority of the sheriff to administer his office and to appoint deputies. It said the sanction was employed only in view of the
type of position that appellant occupied.31 Mr. Justice Black, however, in his dissent from the denial of certiorari by the Supreme
26. Order of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Sept. 20, 1964,
reported in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 752 (1962).
27. Meredith v. Fair, 313 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962).
28. Brief for Appellee, p. 21, Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 1445 (1966).
29. 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964).
30. FLA. STAT. §§30.07, .09 (1965). The removal power rests solely with the
sheriff, except that special power which is given to the Governor, who may act
only with approval of the senate. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §15. The State of Florida,
in its amicus curiae brief, emphasized that the deputies served at the sole discretion of the sheriff, who is subject only to the mandate of the people. The
state urged that just as the office is subject to no other state control, so it should
remain uncontrolled by the federal courts. Brief for the State of Florida as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 6, 7, Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86
Sup. Ct. 1445 (1966). For a discussion of the special deputy sheriff as a state
official see 1959-1960 FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 601.

31.

Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1965).
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saw no reason why the power could not be used to remove

from office a state legislator, judge, or even governor. He saw the
power as new, highly dangerous, and out of place in the federal system. He suggested that its use threatens violation of the tenth amendment and the obligation of the federal government to guarantee to
33
every state a republican form of government.
Whether the expanded contempt power applied in the present
case and its possible extension to other state officials harbors the
dangers feared by Mr. Justice Black should be considered by any
court that approves, expressly or impliedly, such use of the power.
Coercive sanctions for civil contempt against state officials should be
confined to measures that create the minimum interference with
the internal powers of the states, but which possess the authority
necessary to insure compliance with the orders of the court.
ROBERT C. PARKER, JR.

32.
33.

Lance v. Plummer, 86 Sup. Ct. 1380 (1966)
Id. at 1383.
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